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Abstract
University spinoffs are seen as a potential means of generating wealth through the commercialization of 
research. Recognizing the significance of university spinoffs, in the late 1990s the Japanese government 
began to implement changes in legal and policy frameworks to encourage university–industry linkages. 
Within a decade, the number of Japanese bioventures grew significantly. However, only a handful of 
successful bioventures remain. This paper seeks to understand the challenges and the real issues hindering 
the development of university spinoff ventures in the biotechnology industry.  Through case study, it 
examines the history, technology and critical development path of one Japanese bioventure, AnGes MG, 
Inc.
Challenges of University Spinoff Ventures: 
A Case Study of a Japanese Bioventure 
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Introduction 
Since the late 1990s, there have been significant developments in Japan’s innovation system. 
With the bursting of the speculative ‘bubble economy’ and the longest recession in Japan’s 
post-war history that followed it, many of Japan’s idiosyncrasies were called into question. 
In order to deal with the economic crisis, an array of reforms unfolded in Japan. These 
included increases in the government R&D budgets for basic research, changes in legal and 
policy frameworks to encourage university-industry linkages, intellectual property reforms 
and promotion of start-ups such as creation of stock markets for high growth companies and 
changes in commercial code law.
In May 1998, the Japanese government passed a law to promote the transfer of university 
technologies as part of its efforts to facilitate university-industry collaboration. This is known 
as the “Technology Transfer Law”, and allows the establishment of Technology Licensing 
Offices (TLOs), independent of but affiliated with particular universities. The law legitimizes 
and facilitates transparent, contractual transfers of universities’ discoveries to industry. The 
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number of TLOs increased from 5 to 48 by the end of 2007 (Nikkei Biotechnology 2009). 
Through the Technology Transfer Law, university-owned inventions can be licensed through 
TLOs and professors can voluntarily assign their individually-owned inventions to the TLOs.
In April 2000, the “Law to Strengthen Industrial Technology” was implemented. This 
permits faculty at national universities to work for established private enterprises that aim 
to commercialize their research efforts. It also eases limitations on outside work so that 
researchers at national universities can work after hours for a venture business. Faculty 
members can also take up three years’ leave of absence to work in a company to commercialize 
their discoveries and then return to their previous academic positions. According to Kondo 
(2009), this law had a significant effect on university spinoffs. University spinoffs increased 
from 62 in 1999 to 179 in 2003. A fifth of these belonged to life sciences. Nearly 70 percent of 
the founders of spinoffs were faculty members (Kondo 2009).
In 2001, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) initiated the Hiranuma 
Plan, with a goal of establishing 1,000 university-based ventures in three years. METI 
budgeted approximately $380 million for 2002, $438 million for 2003 and $663 million for 
2004 to achieve this goal (Walsh, Baba et al. 2008). By the end of the third year, the Hiranuma 
Plan succeeded in establishing more than 1,000 university ventures. About 40% of these were 
related to biotechnology (METI 2008).  
As a result of these reforms, within a decade, the number of bioventures grew from a 
few tens to a few hundreds. The growth was phenomenal, especially between 1998 and 2004, 
when according to JBA, they grew at an average annual rate of 17%. This was unprecedented 
for Japan’s biotechnology industry. However, on closer inspection, a few disappointing facts 
remain. The number of newly established bioventures has decreased each year since 2004. In 
2008, only 14 were established, compared to 76 new bioventures in both 2001 and 2004. The 
number of listed bioventures represented only 3.5% of the total number (JBA 2009). Average 
sales per listed bioventure were approximately $10.8 million in 2008 and $13.4 million in 
2009. In addition, most of the sales did not derive from internally developed drugs, but rather 
R&D support payments from their alliance partners. Based on these facts, this paper argues 
that the reforms successfully created a large number of small businesses including university 
spinoffs, but failed to create large, sustainable, competitive companies.
This paper seeks to understand the challenges facing and the real issues hindering the 
development of university spinoff ventures in the biotechnology industry. The case study 
used here is AnGes MG, Inc. (hereafter “AnGes”). AnGes is chosen because it was the first 
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university spinoff in the biotechnology sector to be successfully listed on the Japanese stock 
exchange. As a listed company, information about financials, drug pipelines, technology, R&D, 
etc. is publicly available. Secondly, AnGes is the result of the various institutional reforms 
implemented during the early 2000s to encourage the promotion of university spinoffs. 
Thirdly, AnGes has been established for more than 10 years, which allows a more detailed and 
richer analysis compared to other, newer bioventures. This case study draws upon findings 
from interviews conducted with the CEO of AnGes, Ei Yamada; entrepreneur/founder of 
AnGes, Ryuichi Morishita; AnGes’ investors; annual reports; the company’s website; as well 
as elsewhere.  
 
2.   AnGes – History of Establishment
AnGes was established in December 1999 as a university spinoff to pursue drug discovery and 
development based on gene therapy.1 Its founder was Ryuichi Morishita (hereafter “Morishita”), 
an Associate Professor from the Division of Clinical Gene Therapy at Osaka University. 
Morishita, a graduate of Osaka University Medical School, studied complications related to 
hypertension such as atherosclerosis (a condition that causes the thickening of the artery walls) 
in Osaka University. In August 1991, he became a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University 
School of Medicine under Victor Dzau. From 1991 to 1994, under Dzau’s supervision, he 
studied vascular diseases, methods to stimulate angiogenesis and gene transfer technologies.2 
Morishita returned to Osaka University in 1994 and actively pursued gene therapy 
research. His effort paid back when he discovered a new method to regenerate blood vessels 
using Hepatocyte Growth Factor (hereafter “HGF”) in 1995. His discovery was built upon his 
accumulated years of experience and expertise in Osaka and Stanford universities. Morishita 
had chosen HGF gene rather than other growth factor genes because nobody had yet tried 
using HGF gene for angiogenesis.3 
1 Gene therapy goes one step beyond DNA in making use of the growing knowledge of genomics. In the 
case of gene therapy, the drug is not a piece of synthetic DNA but an entire gene. The gene is carried 
through the whole body into the right cells to make therapeutic protein.
2 Vascular diseases include any condition that affects the circulatory system, such as peripheral artery 
disease. They range from diseases of arteries, veins and lymph vessels to blood disorders that affect 
circulation. Angiogenesis is a physiological process involving the growth of new blood vessels from pre-
existing vessels.
3 Prior to Morishita’s discovery, research and observation of HGF gene had been conducted with the aim of 
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Morishita’s discovery and techniques were documented in his patent “Medicine 
Comprising HGF Gene”, first filed in Japan in August 1995. In 2001, the patent was granted 
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). After the patent was filed in 
Japan, Morishita began to publish a series of work in international scientific journals such as 
Journal of Hypertension, Circulation, and Gene Therapy. A search conducted on the Web of 
Science database using the keywords ‘gene therapy’ and ‘hepatocyte growth factor’ showed 
that Morishita’s publications were among the most highly cited. In particular, “Gene therapy 
inhibiting neointimal vascular lesion”, published in February 1995, was cited 544 times by 
others.
Morishita was convinced that his discovery in gene therapy technology would lead to 
something useful in pharmaceuticals. Between 1996 and 1998, he approached several large 
pharmaceutical companies for a joint venture business but his business proposals were rejected 
on the grounds that his discovery was too recent and therefore too risky for pharmaceuticals 
companies. Morishita decided to establish a bioventure to commercialize his research. His 
decision was also influenced by his own experience dealing with biotechnology start-ups 
during his postdoctoral years at Stanford. In addition, the timing of the establishment of AnGes 
was right because during the same period Japanese universities lifted restrictions preventing 
professors from starting their own businesses and encouraged many transfers of university 
technologies through university spinoffs.
Morishita realized that he needed someone with business experience to run the venture. 
He was a scientist and was neither keen on nor experienced with the running and managing of 
a bioventure. He managed to persuade Kensuke Tomita (hereafter “Tomita”) to join his new 
venture.4 Morishita first met Tomita in 1996 when Tomita consulted him about the potential of 
HGF gene in generating new blood vessels. During the meeting, Tomita was surprised to find 
out that Morishita’s discovery had not been taken up by any pharmaceutical company. 
In December 1999, Morishita, Tomita and Toshikaze Nakamura invested a total of 
approximately $107,000 of their own money to establish MedGene Bioscience, Inc, later 
finding a cure for hepatic or liver diseases. HGF was first confirmed in 1984 as a protein that helps hepatic 
cells to multiply, by Toshikaze Nakamura, a professor at Osaka University.
4 Tomita graduated from University of Tokyo in 1974, held a number of positions in pharmaceutical 
companies such as Sankyo (now Daiichi Sankyo), Eli Lilly Japan, Sandoz Pharmaceuticals, and Rhône-
Poulenc Rorer Japan (now Sanofi-Aventis) and RPR Gencell before serving as the first CEO of AnGes. 
Tomita left AnGes in 2003 and currently is the Chairman of OncoTherapy Science, another listed 
bioventure in Japan.
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renamed AnGes.5 Shortly after its establishment, Morishita was able to obtain positive pre-
clinical data regarding the efficacy of HGF gene in generating blood vessels compared to 
similar kinds of therapy in the US. He realized that in order for AnGes to be a leader in gene 
therapy, media exposure was critical. Hence he began to participate in BioJapan, one of the 
largest industry events for biotechnology in Japan. According to the Nikkei Weekly, Morishita 
made a convincing presentation about the therapeutic potential of HGF genetic drug in treating 
vascular diseases caused by blockage of blood vessels. Although relatively unknown at that 
time, AnGes’ debut in BioJapan attracted the media’s attention and heightened the potential of 
biotechnology business in Japan (Nikkei Weekly, 2000).
In June 2000, Morishita stepped down and appointed Tomita as CEO of AnGes. 
According to Morishita, AnGes should be run by a businessman and not a scientist. In 
November 2000, Morishita managed to persuade another individual, Hitoshi Kotani (hereafter 
“Kotani”) to join AnGes. Morishita met Kotani in 1998 during a gene therapy academic 
conference organized by Osaka University.6 Kotani was valuable to AnGes because he had 
extensive experience with gene therapy.
After assembling his management team, Morishita faced daunting challenges in obtaining 
funding. Due to the lack of venture capital investment at that time, it was decided that the best 
way was through an initial public offering (IPO). Masanori Murayama (hereafter “Murayama”) 
was brought in as CEO for the listing preparation. Morishita had met Murayama at a biotech-
networking conferences and considered him a good candidate to lead AnGes’ IPO because of 
his rich investment banking experience as well as his personal network. However, a month 
prior to the IPO, Ei Yamada (hereafter “Yamada”) replaced Maruyama as the CEO of AnGes.7 
5 Nakamura is a professor at Osaka University. He was the first to confirm in 1984 that HGF as a protein 
could help hepatic cells to grow.
6 Kotani graduated from University of Tokyo School of Agricultural and Life Sciences in 1980. He 
received his postdoctoral from Cornell Institute of Medical Research in the US. In 1991, he joined Genetic 
Therapy, Inc., one of the earliest biotechnology companies involved in gene therapy. The scientific founder 
of Genetic Therapy was French Anderson, also known as the “father of gene therapy.” The first gene 
therapy trial conducted in Japan, at Hokkaido University, also used the gene carrier developed by Genetic 
Therapy. Source: http://www.amefrec.co.jp/ecolo/056/56_top.html
7 Some investors raised concerns that AnGes should be led by a CEO with drug R&D experience rather 
than a CEO with investment banking experience to portray the image of a biotechnology company. Thus 
in September 2001, the transition of management took place with Yamada being appointed as the CEO, 
while Murayama was appointed as the CFO. Murayama left AnGes in March, 2003 to establish another 
bioventure, Y’s Therapeutics.
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Yamada remains the CEO of AnGes today. 
Yamada, who graduated from Tohoku University School of Medicine in 1981, had R&D 
experience in pharmaceuticals and bioventures through his work at Mitsubishi Chemical, Sosei 
and Takara Shuzo. From 1982 to 1995, while working for Mitsubishi Chemical, Yamada had 
the opportunity to deal with Genentech, concerning the licensing of biotechnology drugs. In 
one of his visits to the US, Yamada was introduced to Morishita, then a postdoctoral fellow at 
Stanford. The two of them became good friends. After the incorporation of AnGes, Morishita 
persuaded Yamada to work for AnGes; and in 2001, Yamada joined AnGes.
3.   AnGes – Pipelines and Drug Development Process
HGF gene therapy was the main pipeline for the company. AnGes was using HGF gene 
therapy for two indications or target diseases: Peripheral Arterial Disease (hereafter “PAD”) 
and Ischemic Heart Disease (hereafter “IHD”). Both diseases relate to the blockage of blood 
circulation, which can lead to pain and tissue damage. PAD is a condition that affects the limbs 
and IHD is one that affects the heart. HGF can only be injected around the organ’s muscles, 
which explains why it is only used in limb and heart diseases. 
For PAD, AnGes was using HGF gene therapy for diabetic patients by providing a 
treatment of deteriorating blood circulation in limbs (see Figure 1). Patients with severe PAD 
have their limbs amputated as the last resort to prevent death since there is no other treatment 
available. According to Yamada, it is estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000 severe diabetic 
patients a year in Japan are at risk of having their limbs amputated. The statistics are even 
more alarming in the US, where around 500,000 severe diabetic patients a year are at risk.
Figure 1: HGF Gene Therapy for Peripheral Arterial Disease (PAD)
 
Before genetic medicine      After genetic medicine 
Source: AnGes’ website 
 
One of the challenges of drug discovery and development is the long gestation 
period. The process of HGF gene therapy for PAD took around 10 years from pre-
clinical testing to the drug application stage. As for IHD, nine patients were enrolled for 
a Phase 1 clinical trials in the US in the late 2005 but no further updates are provided 
since then. Thus the analysis for this case study is limited to HGF gene therapy for PAD 
(see Table 2).  
As shown in Table 2, the pre-Clinical/proof of concept stage began in Osaka 
University by Morishita and his team. In late 2000, Morishita obtained positive pre-
clinical results and announced his findings in BioJapan. In late 2002, AnGes started 
preparing for kakunin shinsei (application for confirmation to conduct clinical trials), a 
process required by the PMDA (Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency) before 
an IND (Investigational New Drug). The kakunin shinsei process is only required in 
Japan for biotechnology-based drugs and not for chemical-based drug; the underlying 
reason is that the former are relatively new in Japan (PMDA 2009).  
 
Table 2: Timeline for HGF gene therapy  
 
Source: This table is created using AnGes’ annual reports, press release and interview data.  
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One of the challenges of drug discovery and development is the long gestation period. 
The process of HGF gene therapy for PAD took around 10 years from pre-clinical testing to 
the drug application stage. As for IHD, nine patients were enrolled for a Phase 1 clinical trials 
in the US in the late 2005 but no further updates are provided since then. Thus the analysis for 
this case study is limited to HGF gene therapy for PAD (see Table 2). 
As shown in Table 2, the pre-Clinical/proof of concept stage began in Osaka University 
by Morishita and his team. In late 2000, Morishita obtained positive pre-clinical results and 
announced his findings in BioJapan. In late 2002, AnGes started preparing for kakunin shinsei 
(application for confirmation to conduct clinical trials), a process required by the PMDA 
(Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency) before an IND (Investigational New Drug). 
The kakunin shinsei process is only required in Japan for biotechnology-based drugs and not 
for chemical-based drug; the underlying reason is that the former are relatively new in Japan 
(PMDA 2009). 
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It took almost 18 months to get an approval of kakunin shinsei from PMDA, because the 
guidelines for this were often not specifically described, instead  depending on the biological 
source, target disease, site of administration, method of medication, etc. This resulted in many 
case-by-case consultations with PMDA which further prolonged the investigational process. 
Yamada recalled that after the submission of kakunin shinsei, PMDA came back with 300 
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questions regarding HGF gene therapy’s protocol.8 
After obtaining the approval in September 2004, AnGes proceeded with clinical testing. 
“Translational research” based on clinical research conducted by Morishita was used for 
Phase 1 and Phase 2 clinical testing.9 With the translational research results, AnGes was able 
to advance directly to Phase 3 clinical testing in March 2005. In June 2007, Phase 3 clinical 
testing was completed in Japan with 40 patients, fewer than the initial proposed number of 
120. The difficulty in patient recruitment was the result of a lack of incentives provided for 
both patients and physicians in Japan.10 
With positive results obtained from Phase 3 clinical testing, AnGes filed for a NDA (New 
Drug Application) in March 2008. However in September 2010, after 2.5 years of extensive 
consultations with PMDA, PMDA concluded that further accumulation of evidence was 
required for the a NDA approval. AnGes decided to temporarily withdraw the NDA in Japan. 
According to press release, AnGes planned to resubmit the NDA upon completion of its Phase 
3 clinical testing in the US (AnGes 2010).
The withdrawal of the NDA was a disappointment because it further delayed the HGF 
drug development process. Intense competition means that time is of the essence in the 
race to commercialize biotechnology drugs. For the development of its HGF gene therapy 
drug, AnGes faced competition from among others Sanofi Aventis, Genzyme, and Cardium 
Therapeutics (see Table 3). Even though all of these companies were using different genes and 
gene carriers/vector, they were all competing in the same target market. As shown in Table 3, 
AnGes was initially ahead in the process of obtaining a NDA for Japan’s market. However, 
with the rejection from PMDA, AnGes had to wait for its Phase 3 clinical trials in the US, 
which might take several more years and cost several hundred more million dollars. 
8 When AnGes submitted for an Investigational New Drug (IND) to the FDA in the US in December 2002, 
the FDA came back with only 20 inquiries. Within three months, an approval for IND was obtained. 
9 This was an exceptional case in order to obtain more accurate data on the safety and efficacy of 
HGF gene. Clinical research data conducted by universities are usually not integrated into the clinical 
testing process unless permission has been obtained. Under the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law (“chiken” 
in Japanese), the “sponsors” for clinical testing can only be pharmaceutical companies (including 
bioventures). Clinical testing performed by medical doctors and university researchers is known as 
clinical research. In addition, the two separate systems do not share a common information database.  The 
separation between clinical research and clinical testing leads to inefficiencies in the drug development 
process. (Kawakami and Yamane 2007).
10 This point is also highlighted by Yamada (2005) and Yonekura and Suzuki (2006).
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had to wait for its Phase 3 clinical trials in the US, which might take several more years 
and cost several hundred more million dollars.  
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recognized with 17 awards, including a Young Investigator’s Award (Japanese Circulation 
Society), Young Researcher Award (Japan Atherosclerosis Society) and Harry Goldblatt Award 
(Council for High Blood Pressure Research).
The findings in Table 5 also suggest the role of AnGes as a mechanism of knowledge 
transfer from the university. This type of university spinoff role is pointed to by Lynskey 
(2004). Knowledge from Osaka University was transferred to AnGes in two ways: codified 
(assignment of patents) and tacit (Morishita’s involvement). As a scientific founder, Morishita 
had been instrumental in providing R&D direction, advice and guidance. The research team 
in AnGes had benefited by working closely with Morishita and other professors in Osaka 
University through a number of joint research projects particularly during the early stages of 
drug discovery and development.  
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Toshio Ogihara 8 38% 48 Osaka University
Mokokuni Aoki 6 29% 17 Osaka University
Total Patent 
Familes
Top 3 Inventors 
(HVJ-Envelope)
# of Patent 
Family
Share of 
Patent 
Families
Patent 
Citation 
(count) 
Affiliation
Ryuichi Morishita 6 67% 20 Osaka University
Yasufumi Kaneda 4 45% 18 Osaka University
Mokokuni Aoki 2 22% 6 Osaka University
HVJ-Envelope
NFkB Decoy
HGF
All pipelines 59
31
21
9
Table 5: AnGes Patent Analysis (as of June 2010)
Source: This table is created using data from Derwent Innovation Index. 
Another indication of collaboration between university and industry is the extent of 
science linkage. Research conducted by N rin, et al. (1997) and Tamada, et al. (2004) has 
28
Hosei University Repository
suggested that technologies for the application of biotechnology in drugs and medicine are 
closer to basic science than are the equivalents in other fields such as chemistry, electronics 
and manufacturing. Thus it follows that companies with high science linkage patents tend to 
be closely linked to universities because universities are the providers of basic science. 
In order to analyze the extent of science linkage, non-patent references (NPR) such as 
scientific journals cited in AnGes’ issued patents were selected. Based on Narin’s methodology 
of using NPR, a similar type of analysis is conducted. Specifically, the NPR cited by patent 
examiner on the front pages of the issued USPTO patents is used. AnGes scores an average 
scientific citation number of 5.58 based on the 12 USPTO issued patents (see Table 6). Narin’s 
research showed that in 1995, the average number of scientific citations per drug and medicine 
patent for Japan was 3.26 (Narin, et al. 1997). Despite the small sample size, the high science 
linkage score demonstrated that AnGes and Osaka University collaborated closely with one 
another.  
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In order to analyze the extent of science linkage, non-patent references (NPR) such 
as scientific journals cited in AnGes’ issued patents were selected. Based on Narin’s 
methodology of using NPR, a similar type of analysis is conducted. Specifically, the 
NPR cited by patent examiner on the front pages of the issued USPTO patents is used. 
AnGes scores an average scientific citation number of 5.58 based on the 12 USPTO 
issued patents (see Table 6). Narin’s research showed that in 1995, the average number 
of scientific citations per drug and medicine patent for Japan was 3.26 (Narin, et al. 
1997). Despite the small sample size, the high science linkage score demonstrated that 
AnGes and Osaka University collaborated closely with one another.   
 
Table 6: AnGes Science Linkage (as of June 2010) 
 
Source: This table is created using data from USPTO database. 
  
Patent No Issued Date Filing Date Title NPR 
cited by 
applicant
NPR cited 
by 
examiner
Assignee
US 6936594 30-Aug-05 18-Sep-00 Gene therapy for 
cerebrovascular disorders
15 12 Ryuichi Morishita
AnGes MG
US 6989374 24-Jan-06 5-Oct-00 Gene therapy for 
cardiomyopathy
44 5 AnGes MG
US 7247620 24-Jul-07 9-May-02 Method of treating skin 
wounds with vectors encoding 
hepatocyte growth factor
33 21 AnGes MG
US 7259149 21-Aug-07 2-Dec-03 Methods for treating or 
preventing angiogenesis-
dependent symptoms
11 4 AnGes MG
US 6913923 9-Oct-07 14-Apr-04 Virus envelope vector for gene 
transfer
9 7 AnGes MG
US 7285540 23-Oct-07 9-Jul-03 Medicament comprising HGF 
gene 
45 4 AnGes MG
US 7345158 18-Mar-08 25-Mar-03 Actin related cytoskeletal 
protein “LACS” 
9 3 AnGes MG
US 7427395 23-Sep-08 29-Oct-03 Chemotherapeutic agent-
incorporated pharmaceutical 
11 1 Genomidea
Anges MG
US 7504098 17-Mar-09 25-Feb-05 Method for introducing a 
biological molecule using a 
viral envelope  
17 1 AnGes MG
US 7585848 8-Sep-09 11-Jan-05 Methods and compositions for 
treating, inhibiting and 
reversing disorders of the 
intervertebral disc 
45 3 Rush University 
Medical Center
AnGes MG
US 7595301 29-Sep-09 29-Sep-04 Staple type oligonucleotide and 
drug comprising the same
11 4 AnGes MG
US 7524830 28-Apr-09 12-Oct-06 Decoy-containing 
pharmaceutical compositions 
and method of using the same
18 2 AnGes MG
US 7790692 7-Sep-10 31-Mar-05 Hepatocyte growth factor 
nucleic acid sequence to 
enhance musculocutaneous
17 3 AnGes MG
21.9 5.34Average NPR (Non Patent Reference)
Table 6: AnGes Science Linkage (as of June 2010)
Source: This table is created using data from USPTO database.
5.   AnGes – Funding
As a drug discovery and development bioventure, AnGes required substantial and persistent 
funding for its R&D expenses. It spent an average of approximately $28 million a year on 
R&D,14  its highest expenditure item. The R&D intensity (R&D expense over sales) was more 
than 100% for most years. The second highest expenditure was the salary of the employees. 
14 This is based on average R&D expenses from 2001 to 2009. See Table 7.
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As of December 2009, AnGes had 80 employees and the total salary expense was $7.8 million. 
The average monthly burn rate from 2001 to 2009 was approximately $2.8 million (see Table 
7).15 In other words, for every month in these nine years the company spent an average of $2.8 
million to conduct its operation.
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See footnote16. Sources: AnGes 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009a 
 
In order to afford this, access to funding was critical. The earliest funding of 
$107,000 came from the founders. The company did not receive any funding from angel 
investors, Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grants from the government, or 
from venture capital investors.17 The main reason was the limited supply of venture 
capital funds in Japan. In 1999 for example, only 3.6% of Japanese venture capital fund 
                                                 
14 This is based on average R&D expenses from 2001 to 2009. See Table 7. 
15 Burn rate is the rate at which a new company uses up its cash resources or capital before 
producing a positive cash flow. The burn rate is usually expressed as the amount of capital 
used per month or average monthly operating expense.  
16 Sales here are not actual product sales but up-front contract fees, milestone fees, and R&D 
support payments which AnGes received from Daiichi Sankyo and are considered as 
revenues in AnGes financial statements. 
17  The only exception was a $300,000 funding from BioFrontier Partners. BioFrontier 
Partners is an independent boutique venture capital firm focused on life science companies. 
The company was set up in March, 1999 and led by Yoshihiro Otaki. AnGes was 
BioFrontier Partners’ first investment. 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sales 1,300 1,794 2,453 2,696 2,430 2,912 1,720 951 586
R&D Expenses 745 1,726 2,807 3,679 3,791 3,852 3,147 2,911 2,350
R&D Intensity 
(R&D/Sales) 57% 96% 114% 136% 156% 132% 183% 306% 401%
Selling, general and 
administrative (SGA) 
(incl salary)
291 582 593 578 610 583 613 675 779
Total Operating 
Expenses (R&D +SGA) 1,036 2,308 3,400 4,257 4,401 4,435 3,760 3,586 3,129
Burn rate (amount per 
month) 86 192 283 355 367 370 313 299 261
Amount (in million yen)
Table 7: AnGes Total Operating Expenses (2012–2009)
See footnote16 . Sources: AnGes 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009a
In order to afford this, access to funding was critical. The earliest funding of $107,000 
came from the founders. The company did not receive any funding from angel investors, Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grants from the government, or from venture capital 
investors.17 The main reason was the limited supply of venture capital funds in Japan. In 1999 
for example, only 3.6% of Japanese venture capital fund investment was in biotechnology. 
Many of the Japanese venture capital firms were risk-averse to the idea of investing in 
bioventures at that time because biotechnology was relatively unknown. At that time, there 
was no precedent for any form of exits such as IPO, acquisition or trade sale in biotechnology 
investments.
15 Burn rate is the rate at which a new company uses up its cash resources or capital before producing a 
positive cash flow. The burn rate is usually expressed as the amount of capital used per month or average 
monthly per ting expen . 
16 Sales here are not actual product sales but up-front contract fees, milestone fees, and R&D support 
payments which AnGes received from Daiichi Sankyo and are considered as revenues in AnGes financial 
statements.
17 The only exception was a $300,000 funding from BioFrontier Partners. BioFrontier Partners is an 
independent boutique venture capital firm focused on life science companies. The company was set up in 
March, 1999 and led by Yoshihiro Otaki. AnGes was BioFrontier Partners’ first investment.
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With limited access to venture capital funding, AnGes decided to seek funding through 
public equity via an IPO in late 2001. Nomura Securities was engaged to prepare for the listing 
exercise. The world’s financial market at that time was bearish following the 9/11 terrorist 
attack. Despite uncertainty in the financial market, AnGes continued with its listing exercise 
because its cash was running low. Yamada says:
“We knew that the financial market at that time was not going to be favorable for 
the listing but we needed to find some ways to get capital for our R&D and for 
further development of HGF genetic drugs. If we had missed this listing opportunity, 
we might not have had the chance to survive…” (Excerpt from interview with Ei 
Yamada, CEO of AnGes)
Nomura Securities managed to raise $13 million of private placement for AnGes prior 
to its IPO. Seventy percent of the investment came from Japanese venture capital firms such 
as Fuji Capital, Daiwa Capital, Aozora Investment, Nomura Securities and Asahi Insurance 
Capital, and the remaining 30% from pharmaceutical companies such as Ishihara Sankyo and 
Daiichi Sankyo (Nihon Keizai 2001). 
The listing of AnGes was highly anticipated because it was the first listing of a bioventure 
spinoff from a Japanese university. A month prior to its listing, Nikkei Financial Daily (8 
August, 2002) wrote: 
“Most market participants are focusing their attention on the Mothers market debut 
of AnGes MG Inc (4563) on September 25 because it will be the first IPO in the 
field of genomic drugs. In the US, about 80 biotechnology companies have launched 
their IPOs since 1998, while Japan’s stock markets for start-ups were dominated by 
Internet and service sector companies. AnGes MG’s debut, however will change that 
and provide an opportunity of Japan’s biotech field to become a market stalwart.”
On 25 September, 2002, AnGes was listed on the Mothers stock exchange (part of 
Tokyo Stock Exchange). The IPO provided a funding of approximately $35 million. The 
listing of AnGes made headlines in many major business newspapers. For example, a national 
newspaper reported the following, “The stock of AnGes MG Inc (4563) fetched an opening 
price of ¥400,000, some 82% above the initial public offering price of ¥220,000” (Nihon 
Keizai 2002).
Much of the excitement has to do with AnGes being the first “university-based 
bioventure” to be listed (Nikkei Industrial Daily 2002). In addition, the listing of AnGes 
occurred during a period of “venture boom” in Japan. AnGes’ IPO success, as described by 
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major financial newspapers, spurred the emergence of more bioventures and encouraged the 
existing bioventures to seek similar listing route.
Although the IPO listing provided AnGes with approximately $35 million, the funding 
did not last long because of its high R&D expenses. For the year 2003 alone these were 
approximately $24 million. One year after its listing, in October 2003, AnGes sought follow-
on funding from the market by issuing new shares. These raised  approximately $58 million. 
Nikkei Financial Daily commented that AnGes’ move was timely because there was a growing 
“biotech bubble” due to enthusiasm and interest from the stock market. Five more bioventures 
were newly listed in 2003 (Nikkei Financial Daily 2003). 
By late 2006, funding was running low again because AnGes’ research had entered 
clinical development trials both in the US and in Japan. With no other available funding 
options, on March 2007, AnGes raised its third round of funding from the public equity and 
obtained approximately $73 million.  The demand for AnGes’ shares was driven by two main 
factors. Firstly, AnGes’ pipelines were making significant progress. For example, HGF gene 
therapy for PAD had completed initial early rounds of its Phase 2 clinical trial in the US. 
Secondly, there were positive sentiments from the Japanese stock markets, experiencing a 
rally at that time due to signs of improvement in the overall economy (Schaede 2008). AnGes 
was fortunate to obtain its public equity funding before the window of funding closed. A few 
months later, news about the US subprime crisis came into play and the stock market turned 
bearish. Nine other bioventures that went for IPO from August 2007 to December 2009 could 
only procure an average of $10 million.18 
The second source of funding for AnGes came from its alliance with Daiichi Sankyo.19 
AnGes received a one-time upfront payment plus clinical development support payment by 
milestones. In return, Daiichi Sankyo obtained exclusive rights to distribute and market HGF 
gene therapy in Japan after its approval (AnGes 2001; Nikkei Industrial Daily 2002). In April 
2002, Daiichi Sankyo extended the partnership to include the development of HGF gene 
therapy in the US and Europe. However in February 2009, “as a result of reassessment of their 
18 Bioventures that went for IPO after August 2007 were GNI, Japan Tissue Engineering (J-Tec), 
NanoCarrier, Carna Bioscience, R-Tech Ueno, JCL Bioassay, Tella, CanBas and D.Western Therapeutics’s 
Institutes.
19 In 2005, Daiichi Pharmaceuticals Co., Ltd. merged with Sankyo Co., Ltd. to form Daiichi Sankyo 
Company Limited. In this chapter we refer Daiichi Pharmaceuticals as the merged entity, “Daiichi 
Sankyo”. 
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development portfolio,” Daiichi Sankyo terminated the licensing agreement involving HGF 
gene therapy development in the US and Europe. It  continued to maintain the licensing and 
marketing agreement in HGF gene therapy for Japan (AnGes 2009). This was a major setback 
because AnGes relied heavily on Daiichi Sankyo for part of its R&D funding. AnGes obtained 
a total of approximately $116 million from Daiichi Sankyo in the form of contract fees and 
milestone fees from 2002 to 2009. The R&D support payment was recorded under “Sales” in 
the company’s financial statements.
6.   AnGes – Stock Performance and Market Capitalization
AnGes experienced a phenomenal surge in its stock performance and market capitalization 
during its first year of IPO sSee Figure 2 and 3). Market capitalization went up to almost $700 
million in less than six months after its IPO although the underlying business did not change 
much. AnGes did not even have any Phase 2 pipelines at the time of IPO yet the market 
capitalization for AnGes nearly doubled the average market capitalization of bigger and more 
established biotechnology companies in the US.20   
This inflated market capitalization was due to biotechnology “hype”. Once the hype and 
venture capitalists’ locked-up period were over, investors began to sell AnGes shares, which 
resulted in falling share prices and market capitalization after 2003. AnGes’ stock performance 
and market capitalization continued to decline sharply after late 2007 as a result of delays in its 
milestones and negative pessimism in the overall stock market. 
20 Average market capitalization of sixteen biotechnology IPOs in the US between October 2003 and 
April 2004 was US$350 million (Kneller 2007b). In contrast, AnGes’ market capitalization at IPO was 
approximately US$400 million and within a year doubled to almost US$800 million.
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In a span of three years from 2007 to 2010, AnGes’ stock lost more than 75% of its 
value, from ¥609,000 in January 2007 to ¥139,300 in January 2010. The stock price in 
January 2010 was almost half the value of its offering IPO price set at ¥220,000. Nikkei 
Business Daily reported that investors were losing confidence in AnGes following its 
failure to market HGF gene therapy by 2005, which it had pledged to do upon its listing 
(Nikkei Business Daily 2008). 
 
There is another reason why AnGes’ stock performance was so volatile. AnGes did 
not have enough institutional investors. An analysis of its shareholding structure at the 
end of 2009 revealed that 85% of its shares were held by individual investors with 
Morishita as the largest single shareholder, with 7.14% (see Table 8).  
 
The downside of having individual investors is that stock prices are subject to 
greater volatility because individual investors are vulnerable to dips in consumers’ 
disposable income and declines in the stock market. Particularly during “down markets”, 
individual investors tend to dump risky stocks in favor of cash or more stable stocks.  
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In a span of three years from 2007 to 2010, AnGes’ stock lost more than 75% of its value, 
from ¥609,000 in January 2007 to ¥139,300 in January 2010. The stock price in January 2010 
was lmos  half the value of its offering IPO price se at ¥220,000. Nikkei Busine s Daily 
reported that investors were losing confidence in AnGes following its failure to market HGF 
gene therapy by 2005, which it ad pledged to do upon its listing (Nikkei Busin s Daily 
2008).
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There is another reason why AnGes’ stock performance was so volatile. AnGes did not 
have enough institutional investors. An analysis of its shareholding structure at the end of 2009 
revealed that 85% of its shares were held by individual investors with Morishita as the largest 
single shareholder, with 7.14% (see Table 8). 
The downside of having individual investors is that stock prices are subject to greater 
volatility because individual investors are vulnerable to dips in consumers’ disposable income 
and declines in the stock market. Particularly during “down markets”, individual investors tend 
to dump risky stocks in favor of cash or more stable stocks. 
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7.   AnGes – Financial Dilemma
At the end of December 2009, AnGes was left with approximately $30 million (see Table 9), 
the lowest level since its IPO in 2002. It risked “valley of death,” a funding shortage during the 
development period leading to commercialization. In the worst scenario, the firm fails because 
it does not have enough funding to sustain its operation. AnGes’ cash flow is illustrated 
schematically in Figure 4. 
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AnGes’ cash flow signals that the management had daunting financial challenges 
ahead. With limited amount of cash remaining AnGes has to manage its cash wisely or 
raised another round of funding. The first option requires AnGes to prioritize its R&D 
which means putting all of its resources on the most promising pipeline. This is a big 
gamble since only 0.02% of compounds at the early stage of research successfully reach 
the market (DiMasi 1995). The second option, fund raising, might not look too 
promising for now. With the recent declines in AnGes’ stock performance and market 
capitalization, it will be difficult for it to raise another round of follow-on funding from 
the market. Faced with the current financial dilemmas, AnGes has to come up with 
more innovative solutions in order to survive.  
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AnGes’ cash flow signals that the management had daunti g financial challenges ahead. 
With limited amount of cash remaining AnGes has to manage its cash wisely or raised another 
round of funding. The first option requires AnGes to prioritize its R&D which means putting 
all of its resources on the most promising pipeline. This is a big gamble since only 0.02% of 
compounds at the early stage of res arch successfully reach the market (DiMasi 1995). The 
second option, fund raising, might not look too promising for now. With the recent declines in 
AnGes’ stock performance and market capitalization, it will be difficult for it to raise another 
round of follow-on funding from the market. Faced with the current financial dilemmas, 
AnGes has to come up with more innovative solutions in order to survive. 
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Table 9: AnGes Statement of Cash Flow 21 (2001–2009)
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8. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This case study highlights the challenges of a university spinoff in the biotechnology 
industry. AnGes was created in the late 1990s, motivated by a series of institutional 
reforms in Japan to spur the development of start-ups. It remains a relatively small 
company (in terms of number of pipelines, alliances, sales and market capitalization) 
despite being in operation for so many years. In order to identify the real factor 
hindering its development, this case study has analyzed some of the factors that drive 
the growth of bioventures, namely academic entrepreneurship, experienced managers, 
technology, intellectual property, university–industry linkages, an efficient drug 
regulatory system and sustainable funding. All of these are present in AnGes except for 
an efficient drug regulatory system and sustainable funding.  
 
Moritshita displayed the characteristics and qualities of an academic entrepreneur. 
He took the risk to establish a bioventure to commercialize his own research discoveries. 
He was also responsible for the recruitment of experienced managers such as Tomita, 
Murayama and Yamada, and the initial fund raising process. AnGes was led by 
experienced managers. All of the CEOs had extensive working experience in the 
industry. AnGes possessed good technology seeds from Osaka University. The 
technology in AnGes was highly recognized, as shown by the patent analysis and non-
patent references.  In addition, alliance with Daiichi Sankyo for the development of 
HGF gene therapy also provided legitimacy to the potential of AnGes’ technology. 
AnGes also demonstrated strong university-industry linkages. The company maintained 
                                                 
21 Cash flow from operating activities refer to the amount of cash AnGes generates (in this 
case, payment from Daiichi) minus R&D and other operating expenses. Negative cash flow 
from operating activities shows that R&D expenses exceed the proceeds from operation. 
Cash flow from investing activities show AnGes’ investment of its surplus of cash. Cash 
flow from financing activities refer to inflow of cash from investors (in this case IPO 
proceeds and two rounds of follow-on funding from capital market). 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Cash Flow from Operating 
Activities 165 -731 -689 -1,433 -1,686 -898 -1,976 -1,978 -2,225
Cash Flow from Investing 
Activities -222 -241 -4,484 2,962 -336 -703 -3,668 1,526 -530
Cash Flow from Financing 
Activities 1,339 3,506 5,927 899 688 395 7,446 29 11
Net increase (decrease) in cash 
and cash equivalents 1,282 2,534 754 2,428 -1,334 -1,206 1,802 -423 -2,750
Cash and cash equivalents at the 
beginning of period 17 1,299 3,833 4,587 7,015 5,681 4,475 6,276 5,799
Cash and cash equivalents at 
the end of period 1,299 3,833 4,587 7,015 5,681 4,475 6,276 5,799 3,049
Amount (in million yen)
 Source: AnGes 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009a
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took the risk to establish a bioventure to commercialize his own research discoveries. He 
was also responsible for the recruitment of experienced managers such as Tomita, Murayama 
and Yamada, and the initial fund raising process. AnGes was led by experienced managers. 
All of the CEOs had extensive working experience in the industry. AnGes possessed good 
21 Cash flow from operating activities refer to the amount f cash AnGes generates (in this case, payment 
from Daiichi) minus R&D and other operating expenses. Negative cash flow from operating activities 
shows that R&D expenses exceed the proceeds from operation. Cash flow from investing activities show 
AnGes’ investment of its surplus of cash. Cash flow from financing activities refer to inflow of cash from 
investors (in this case IPO proceeds and two rounds of follow-on funding from capital market).
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technology seeds from Osaka University. The technology in AnGes was highly recognized, 
as shown by the patent analysis and non-patent references.  In addition, alliance with Daiichi 
Sankyo for the development of HGF gene therapy also provided legitimacy to the potential 
of AnGes’ technology. AnGes also demonstrated strong university-industry linkages. The 
company maintained close collaboration with Osaka University through a number of research 
collaborations and joint patent filings. 
In terms of Japanese drug regulatory system, AnGes experienced the following issues. 
First, a difficulty in recruiting patients for clinical trials due to the lack of incentives for 
both patients and physicians. According to Yonekura and Suzuki (2006), Japan has about a 
quarter to a third number of reviewers compared to the US. In recent years, the number of 
reviewers has increased; but compared to other developed countries, a huge gap still exists. 
For example as of April 1, 2009, PMDA has a total of 521 full-time employees of whom 346 
were ‘Review Staff’ and 82 were ‘Safety Staff’ (PMDA 2009). Compared to the US, the FDA 
had 1,300 reviewers in the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, which regulates new 
pharmaceuticals approval. Secondly, a longer approval time for biotechnology drugs due to 
the lack of qualified reviewers in the area of biopharmaceuticals. This was evident by AnGes’ 
experience in getting a kakunin shinsei and a NDA from PMDA.
Finally, the most critical factor for AnGes is funding. In terms of funding, AnGes 
experienced various issues as explained below. The lack of alternative funding institutions 
such as angel investment and SBIR funding forced AnGes to rely solely on venture capital and 
IPO funding. AnGes obtained no venture capital funding during its formation years. It received 
this only during the later stage – a year prior to IPO. Such funding cannot be considered as 
true venture capital funding, where investment is targeted to support high risk, high growth 
ventures. Rather, it is private placement, where investment is targeted at pre-IPO companies 
with the goal of making short term capital gains. AnGes’ IPO was deemed too early or 
“premature”. At the time of AnGes’ IPO, most of its pipelines were still in the early stages of 
R&D. This is another reason why AnGes repeatedly sought many rounds of funding after its 
IPO. In contrast, most biotechnology start-ups in the US have angel investments and/or series 
of venture capital funding before staging an IPO (Robbins-Roth 2000). Even though, AnGes 
was fortunate to obtain a total of approximately $166 million from its IPO and two rounds 
of follow-on funding from the equity market, this is only a fraction of the total cost of drug 
Challenges of University Spinoff Ventures: A Case Study of a Japanese Bioventure
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development (Robbins-Roth 2000; DiMasi, Hansen et al. 2003).22  
This case study highlights that by falling to provide adequate reforms in Japan’s funding 
institutions such as venture capital, the government may succeed in creating a large number 
of university spinoffs but failed to nurture these ventures into large, sustainable, competitive 
companies. The venture capital model in Japan is still largely risk-averse and tends to focus 
on late-stage investments with the aim of obtaining short-term capital gains. In Japan, the 
main investors for venture capital are still mainly made up of banks’ subsidiaries, investment 
security houses and insurance companies. Contributions from pension funds remain small, 
amounting to less than 3% of the total venture capital funding from 2001 to 2008 (JVCA 
2009). This is a big contrast to the US, where pension funds are the biggest investors averaging 
about 35 to 40% of the total venture capital funding (NVCA 2010). According to Wall Street 
Journal Asia, the Japanese Government Pension Investment is the biggest single pension fund 
in the world, with an asset base of ¥123 trillion or $1.433 trillion. If a mere 1% of the fund’s 
assets were invested into venture capital, this would equal to $14.3 billion, more than seven 
times the venture capital investment made in Japan in 2008. In other words, rules were made 
to allow pension funds to invest in venture capital since 1997 but that did not seem to have 
much impact on the development of venture business in Japan (Wall Street Journal Asia 2010).
AnGes was a rising star of Japanese bioventure, being the first successfully listed 
bioventure, and a showcase of a successful university spinoff from Osaka Univeristy. However, 
without sustainable funding, it had to spend time and resources to look for the next funding. 
Funding limitation also caused delays in its drug development process. After the Global 
Financial Crisis, stock performance and market capitalization began to fall sharply because the 
biotechnology hype was over and its stock value was kept  artificially high prior to the crisis. 
AnGes was trapped in a vicious cycle as it began to exhaust its funding. Less funding in R&D 
led to a slower drug development process and fewer clinical development pipelines. Fever 
pipelines at the later stage of clinical development translated into lower chances of attracting 
alliances with pharmaceutical companies. This led to delays in targeted milestones, decrease 
in sales, loss of confidence in its existing investors and new investors. In order to break this 
vicious cycle, AnGes’ hope lies in the promise of its gene therapy and a rebounding economy. 
22 The average out-of-pocket cost per new drug is US$456 million (2000 dollars). US$121 million 
from early research to preclinical testing and US$355 million from Phase 1 to Phase 3 clinical testing. 
Capitalizing out-of-pocket costs to the point of marketing approval at a real discount rate of 11% yields a 
total pre-approval cost estimate of US$802 million.
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